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Every fundamental trait which underlies everything that happens, which expresses 
itself in everything that happens, ought to lead an individual who felt it as his 
fundamental trait to welcome triumphantly every moment of general existence. The 
point would be precisely to experience this fundamental trait in oneself as good, as 
valuable, with pleasure. (Nietzsche 2003: 118) 
 
One of many contemporary pessimisms is a pessimism about pleasure as well as optimism 
itself. The argument goes that pleasure is fleeting and only leads us to desire more at its end 
and is therefore ultimately a negative force. Happiness and wellbeing are more acceptable 
because they help us be sociable, productive, and reduce or eliminate depression. A number 
of academics, politicians and school leaders have lately been engaged in clumsily adapting 
Buddhist teachings to Western contexts under the rhetoric of “wellbeing” and “mindfulness.” 
Anthony Seldon's recent book Beyond Happiness decries pleasure as a “purely self-centred, 
egotistical and narcissistic state” (Seldon 2015: 16). For him 
Happiness is a deeper and more rewarding condition. We are no longer isolated 
individuals but in a relationship with others, and with our deeper selves. It is not 
dependent upon consumption or personal acquisition. We act directly in order to 
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achieve pleasure but we experience happiness as a by product of living wisely. If we 
want to be happy, we thus have to live well, and we need to act morally. (Seldon 
2015: 16) 
Following this prescriptively moral definition he goes even further and argues that “Joy is 
deeper still, and is experienced when the profoundest part of us is in complete harmony with 
the rest of creation. To achieve this state we may need to negate ourselves, our egos, and 
become one with the whole” (Seldon 2015: 16). This quasi-religious and philosophically 
questionable ‘one-ness’ then becomes the product which is on sale to the individual in place 
of more obviously ‘pleasurable’ products. But as William Davies writes as part of his critique 
of what he calls the ‘happiness industry’, “Positive psychology, which repeats the mantra that 
happiness is a personal “choice”, is as a result largely unable to provide the exit from 
consumerism and egocentricity that its gurus sense many people are seeking” (Davies 2015, 
17). Seldon's “selling” of joy thus turns it into another consumer item that is desired by the 
very consciousness it is seeking to vacate. This form of false enlightenment is based on many 
unnamed predicates, such as the harmony of existence, the self-presence of a subject, the 
unquestioned agency of a subject, and the capacity for an agential self-present subject to void 
itself and become aligned with the supposed harmony of existence. The conception or 
experience of existence as remuant (Bojesen 2015) - which is to say, fickle, changeable and 
restless – rejects the necessity of all these predicates, especially those of the self-present 
agential subject and the possibility of a harmonious relationship between the individual and 
what Seldon calls “creation.” It also rejects that existence is a “whole” and instead contests 
that existence is experienced only as incidences of occursions, some of which endure long 
enough to be considered visitant (such as the idea of the subject or the planet called Earth). 
Seldon’s approach towards the possibility of harmony effaces the entire realm of identity 
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politics in favour of the individual will (which then - unconvincingly - effaces itself), 
seemingly unmitigated by contextual factors.  This is an implicit affront to Queer Theory, 
which has long engaged in disrupting harmonious narratives of social relations, wherein that 
which does not fit the norm of the whole is considered unnatural and aberrant, to be rejected, 
converted or destroyed. Taking Queer Theory further, remuant philosophy removes the very 
foundation on which it is possible to make such judgments. In remuant philosophy, it is 
harmony and wholeness that is an (intellectual) aberration. The closest precursor to the use of 
the term queer optimism in this paper is that of Michael D. Snediker’s Queer Optimism: Lyric 
Personhood and Other Felicitous Persuasions. Snediker is most interested in queer optimism 
as a form of ‘meta-optimism’, which ‘doesn’t aspire toward happiness, but instead finds 
happiness interesting’ (Snediker 2009: 3). This paper attempts not only to find optimism 
interesting but also to localise a queer version of it within a practical form of pedagogy. As 
such, this paper’s optimism is queer because, while extremely pessimistic about educational 
systems and structures, it is optimistic about the pleasure achievable in individual learning 
and teaching experiences. It argues that the optimism is in fact an essential component of a 
pedagogy which attempts to respond to and teach the lessons of existence. Thus, a remuant 
pedagogy is underpinned by the conviction that it is possible to affirm existential experience 
in a pleasurable way: this is its limited but significant queer optimism. 
The popular reception of ideas such as Seldon's (and other purveyors of mindlfulness, 
and happiness) reveals a form of social pedagogy operating between those who are seeking 
better ways to live and those who are offering them (as products). In contrast, the pedagogy 
this essay outlines is not about conveying how best to maintain a consistent state of 
happiness, nor is it about promoting a resignation to our conditions beyond either egoistic 
desire or altruism. It is a queer, optimistic, remuant pedagogy. It is queer because it does not 
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accept that individuals can be the “same” or in harmony with each other or the world and that 
this in itself is a cause for optimism rather than resignation. It is remuant because it rejects 
both an existential “wholeness” but also the very idea that something that is fleeting - such as 
pleasure – is of little or negative value.  The argument presented is twofold: that there are 
certain existential conditions that affect life, even if they are not recognised and that these 
conditions do not preclude certain provisional positivistic pedagogies. These pedagogies are, 
however, precarious. Not in the sense that Judith Butler (Butler 2004: xviii) gives in her 
articulation of “precarious life” through her reading of the face in Levinas, as presenting that 
which is “human” and “injurable” but rather precarious pedagogies as provisional practice. 
Which is to say pedagogical practice within which risk and fate are always visitant. This 
provisional practice of precarious pedagogy is not simply open-minded experimentation or 
the search for an alternative pedagogy. Yes, it is always provisional but this provisionality is 
also located in pedagogy that does not recognise its provisionality. My argument is that any 
practice of any kind is provisional because it is conditioned by the remuant. That is to say, it 
is, as with all existence, changeable, restless and fickle. As such, a pedagogy that explicitly 
recognizes these conditions and behaves as if they were the case might offer a means of 
learning from and about existence that value-based and end-oriented pedagogies do not.  
This does not mean that more socially and economically constrained pedagogical 
methods might not spill over into this existentially broader territory partly because, as Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick writes in her essay on the ‘Pedagogy of Buddhism’, “learning might 
proceed in the absence of spontaneous recognition” (Sedgwick 2003: 169). This aspect of 
Sedgwick’s pedagogy of Buddhism (which has little or no correlation with Seldon’s 
mindfulness) has many lessons and consequences for the thinking of a queer pedagogy for a 
remuant existence and for what could then be called a remuant pedagogy or the pedagogy of 
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the remuant. Precarious pedagogy could then be able to reduce the often implied educational 
privilege of “spontaneous recognition.” This would mean imbuing provisional and precarious 
pedagogy with a certain lack of focus. However, this lack of focus would exist precisely to 
enhance its clarity. Such a practice would emphasise the passive aspects of experience, 
existence and learning, at the same time de-prioritising attention, intention and other ways of 
conceiving of “active learning.” There is an irony between the pedagogical practice here 
proposed and the historical examples of experiential or “progressive education” which are 
explicitly engaged with active and self-directed learning. The pedagogy I propose would 
absolutely not be child-centred. In fact, it would have no centre whatsoever. Of course, this 
emphasis on the passive aspect of learning does not attempt to hark back to classical 
(although often still utilised) modes of education where the student is a passive receptacle for 
the facts conveyed by the teacher. In the pedagogy I propose here, the teacher would also be 
conditioned by a certain passivity.  
One of the things that is most appealing about the approach to pedagogy taken by 
Sedgwick in Touching Feeling is her unrepentant optimism and disposition of affirmation 
rather than negation or scepticism. It is important that the affects of “interest-excitement” and 
“enjoyment-joy” are privileged by Sedgwick (Sedgwick 2003: 21). Even though it is not as if 
they are the only affects of critical or pedagogical interest, there is also no reason not to give 
them particular attention. They are also somewhat concomitant with a certain form of 
Nietzschean affirmation that is inextricable from remuant existence. Sedgwick describes her 
project as an exploration of “promising tools and techniques for nondualistic thought and 
pedagogy” (Sedgwick 2003: 1). She writes of Touching Feeling that “The ideal I’m 
envisioning here is a mind receptive to thoughts, able to nurture and connect them, and 
susceptible to happiness at their entertainment” (Sedgwick 2003: 1). In her essay from this 
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book on “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading” (subtitled, “you’re so paranoid, you 
probably think this essay is about you”) she rejects a form of paranoid critical discourse 
which had and perhaps still has, taken hold of the arts and humanities. A form of discourse 
Nietzsche might call ressentimental, or, in Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche, reactive as 
opposed to passive nihilism: a discourse of unveiling how utterly terrible and claustrophobic 
the conditions of the world we are, usual specifying the condition of some form of total 
revolution or overhaul as the only solution. Ironically, critics who are too eager to posit an 
alternative to the current condition (however unachievable it might be) are less likely to 
provide intellectual sustenance to those existing in that condition. Remuant pedagogy 
attempts the opposite. While recognising the ills of our current condition it seeks spaces of 
optimism and affirmation. Its queer optimism is in its ability to see a more positive present by 
striking a compromise with the negatives that cannot (for the moment) be changed.  While it 
is difficult to be optimistic about the future of our education systems, it is much less difficult 
to be optimistic about our daily teaching and learning practice. In fact, this daily optimism is, 
in Sedgwick’s terms, reparative, not only of the present, but of the concept of pedagogy more 
generally. Sedgwick writes: 
The monopolistic program of paranoid knowing systematically disallows any explicit 
recourse to reparative motives, no sooner to be articulated than subject to 
methodological uprooting. Reparative motives, once they become explicit, are 
inadmissible in paranoid theory both because they are about pleasure (“merely 
aesthetic”) and because they are frankly ameliorative (“merely reformist”). What 
makes pleasure and amelioration so “mere”? Only the exclusiveness of paranoia’s 
faith in demystifying exposure: only its cruel and contemptuous assumption that the 
one thing lacking for global revolution, explosion of gender roles, or whatever, is 
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people’s (that is, other people’s) having the painful effects of their oppression, 
poverty, or deludedness sufficiently exacerbated to make the pain conscious (as if 
otherwise it wouldn’t have been) and intolerable (as if intolerable situations were 
famous for generating excellent solutions. (Sedgwick 2003: 144) 
Paranoid and pessimistic pedagogy is definitely an option – and an option that is chosen by 
many. Seldon, for example, rejects pleasure as being narcissistic, self-centred and egotistical - 
with the weak ‘common sense’ assumption that all of these are negative characteristics – 
paranoid about the emphasis our culture places on it; pessimistic about its value. Not only is 
Seldon’s thinking pessimistic about pleasure, it is pessimistic about any form of self-
assertion, retreating instead into an (albeit illogical) form of self-effacement. Seldon negates 
pleasure and negates individual life, preferring instead a relationship to the ‘whole’. The 
alternative to this negation of the self and its pleasures is an optimistic and affirmative 
pedagogy which in no way reduces an awareness of inequality and injustice but equally is not 
steered by its pessimism and paranoia. But where does this affirmation come from? And why 
should this reparative optimism take precedence over a paranoid pessimism?  
In terms of remuant existence, affirmation can either be occursive – arising in a 
particular incidence, sometimes as if from nowhere, other times seemingly as choice – or it 
can be visitant, which is to say the existence of affirmation endures as part of the existential 
incidence defined by a singular individual: affirmation as a disposition of that individual. But 
this does not yet answer the question of “why optimism?” and it is certainly difficult to 
answer this question in terms of anything but a bland relativity. That is to say why not 
optimism? Optimism is not just the optimism of a “self” deciding to be positive about a 
certain situation or possible outcome, although this would not be precluded. Optimism, in the 
sense I am using it here is much more an affirmation of existence as existence, which is to 
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say, remuant, rather than whole or harmonious. Pessimism and the paranoid mode of thought 
that accompanies it sets the world at a remove and perceives it in terms of an untheorised or 
impossible better world which is not possible or even posited. Affirmation is not the 
Leibnizian affirmation of this world as the best of all possible worlds; it is the Nietzschean 
affirmation of existence as neither best nor worst but as – via Roland Barthes - neutral. This 
affirmation includes an affirmation of desire and will, not as primarily directive of how 
individuals experience and behave in existence but as components of remuant existence.  
Existential affirmation is concomitant with optimism, pleasure and amelioration. To 
affirm is to say yes and to welcome existence rather than to negate and, at least intellectually, 
push it away. This is not to say that to accept and affirm suffering might then make it 
pleasurable or even acceptable – that said, we should take pleasure in fighting against 
suffering and inequality but perhaps only when we actually fight - but rather that incidences 
where pleasure and amelioration are possible are incidences that seem particularly 
predisposed to being affirmed. A pedagogy that is directed towards facilitating pleasure and 
amelioration rather than paranoia and pessimism would be more likely to be existentially 
affirmative. But why does this matter? And why should pedagogy be directed towards 
existential affirmation? I would argue it is because pedagogy is ultimately and can only ever 
be the teaching of existence and can never offer a way out of existence, even if it can change 
that which is. To change the world is also to affirm how it exists as remuant. Thus the 
trajectory of paranoid reading is at a certain level unpedagogical and unexistential because it 
perpetuates and engages only with implied utopic abstractions of the ‘good’, so as to be able 
to present the ‘bad’. The irony being that paranoid and pessimistic reading or pedagogy is 
actually far more utopian than reparative and optimistic reading or pedagogy. This is because 
paranoid critique usually works with the implication that a better world was or is possible, 
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while reparative critique works with the world as it exists. It is of course useful to utilise 
abstractions to point to that which is bad in the world but often paranoid reading is too 
selective in its evidence. It is not an affirmative reading of existence but rather the imposition 
of a narrative on existence. Existence is quite clearly not entirely pleasurable or even 
reparable but many affirmable incidences of existence are within that which is often painted 
with a negative narrative. Affirmation does not mean that everything bad can be made 
pleasurable or repaired but rather that one should not forget to attend to the pleasure that can 
exists within or despite what is superficially or polemically presented as bad.  
In order to effect change, Sedgwick offers what she calls “alternatives to that habitual 
subordination of affect to drive” (Sedgwick 2003: 18). We go from “why does she do this” to 
“why does this happen to her” – to which I would add, my provisional preference: “what is 
happening.” And beyond that, “what changes by attending to this happening.” These are as 
much statements as questions. Occursive statements and questions that themselves become 
involved in the incidence of what happens. Or to posit a new provisional preference: the 
occursive becomes involved in and as incidence. I have privileged the concept of incidence to 
happening because happening is a word that is usually tied to the concept of “event” and as 
such is not suitable for a remuant philosophy, which eschews the imposition of the event and 
instead emphasises incidences of existence that overlap occursively. Some of those 
occursions may present themselves as if they were an event but they are never in fact outside 
of incidence(s). This means that there is no such thing as an event contained within itself. 
Anything that occurs is only ever an event (which is always a “main event” in contrast to 
what occurs around it) because of a subjective designation (this could of course be a “mass” 
subjective designation). Incidence removes this subjective dimension by recognising that 
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what is considered “the event” might simply be the most recognisable occursive aspect of an 
incidence.  
In Touching Feeling Sedgwick draws on a concept akin to incidence by showing how 
what she calls the periperformative clusters around the explicit performative event and exists 
on its peripheries. Meaning also that it may be on the periphery of several explicit 
performatives (Sedgwick 2003: 78-79). Ultimately this logic probably still privileges the 
“explicit performative”, at least more than how the concept of incidence privileges the 
concept of the event: to be clear, incidence does not privilege the event at all. But Sedgwick 
is already aware of this issue, writing that:  
The explicit performative, as Derrida demonstrates, offers itself in the form of 
transparent self-referentiality and pure self-presence, while its force actually depends 
on a tacit citation of past and future and an occluded reference to a space beyond 
itself. The periperformative, by contrast, is openly alloreferential before it is anything 
else. And I don’t think we should assume that we understand in advance, as it were by 
analogy or by simple reversal, what can then be the effects of the sting of self-
reference only half-concealed in its tail. (Sedgwick 2003: 75) 
The periperformative is therefore only ever thought in terms of explicit performances, which 
is problematic in terms of remuant thinking’s lack of privilege given to one incidence or 
occursion over another. However, in a sense, the periperformative allows for this 
deprioritisation of the explicit performative or what could be called “the main event” in a 
different way. The periperformative is involved in the incidence of occursions, within which 
there might be an occursion that asserts (as in the occursion of an explicit performative) or 
casually creates the conditions for something being perceived as if it were a main event. The 
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aspects of incidence which do not occur as if they were the main event are the ones that 
Sedgwick is interested in, in terms of the periperformative.  
The way that Sedgwick approaches texture and affect is extremely helpful in 
understanding the logic of occursion in terms of pedagogy. She writes: 
If texture and affect, touching and feeling seem to belong together, then, it is not 
because they share a particular delicacy of scale, such as would necessarily call for 
“close reading” or “thick description.” What they have in common is that at 
whatever scale they are attended to, both are irreducibly phenomenological. To 
describe them primarily in terms of structure is always a qualitiative 
misrepresentation. Attending to psychology and materiality at the level of affect and 
texture is also to enter a conceptual realm that is not shaped by lack nor by 
commonsensical dualities of subject versus object or means versus ends. (Sedgwick 
2003: 21) 
Affects and textures are themselves occursive and the malleability that Sedgwick affords to 
the scale of these occursions is useful for thinking the occursive more generally. Occursions 
occur: inside, outside, across, through and between could for simplicity’s sake be called 
subjects or objects. But even the very idea of the subject and object is occursive – as are ideas 
or affects that put them into question. This malleability of scale, when discussing texture and 
affect, touching and feeling, or the occursive and the remuant, in terms of pedagogy, is 
important because it opens the field of pedagogy indefinitely and thereby emphasises its 
constitutive provisionality. I would also argue - in the same way that Sedgwick does for 
affect and texture – that reading or teaching existence through the occursive and the remuant 
avoids a conceptual realm limited by binaries and teleologies.  
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Sedgwick’s optimism includes an invitation for something like a reparative 
disposition to become visitant in teaching and reading practice. This would mean looking out 
for or being responsive to what could superficially be called positive as well as negative 
occursions, or as Sedgwick puts it: 
Because there can be terrible surprises, however, there can also be good ones. Hope, 
often a fracturing, even a traumatic thing to experience, is among the energies by 
which the reparatively positioned reader tries to organize the fragments and part-
objects she encounters or creates. Because the reader has room to realize that the 
future may be different from the present, it is also possible for her to entertain such 
profoundly painful, profoundly relieving, ethically crucial possibilities as that the 
past, in turn, could have happened differently from the way it actually did. (Sedgwick 
2003: 146) 
This last concept might be the most beguiling of Touching Feeling. That reparative reading 
and pedagogy could help us to realise that the past could have happened differently from the 
way it actually did, for better or worse, allows us to understand that existence is remuant and 
it always has been. Showing that where we have ended up could not have been predicted, 
helps to show how our future is also not somehow predetermined. Ironically this allows for 
the potential of a more common form of optimism towards educational systems: because 
existence is remuant, they may get better after all. Our attention to the past, in terms of 
history and education is structured around the main events and narratives that grow out of or 
highlight those events. Major narratives trump minor narratives and historical incidences 
which do not easily fit into a narrative find themselves forgotten, ignored, or considered 
insignificant. The major events are then no longer – if they ever were – read as incidences of 
existence which include a host of paths not taken. This means that what we read and teach 
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becomes reduced to the easily transmissible: the performative rather than the 
periperformative. Of course, academic historians re-read the past partly to find more 
convincing interpretations or narratives, and sometimes these narratives contradict and even 
make redundant those which have previously been dominant. Generally speaking the task of 
educators is somewhat the same but threefold: they must present interpretations of the past 
and the “useful facts” or skills it holds, alongside a reading of the present with all its 
problems and opportunities and a protentive reading of the future. Alongside these 
relationships to the past, present a future, there is an existential relation to the actual 
experience of education. Teaching has social duties which it is expected to fulfil - but can it 
not also fulfil the existential obligation of affirmation? Can it not promote pleasure – 
including but not limited to the pleasure of education? Can it not seek to make education 
pleasurable? Affirmation is often pleasurable; pleasure is usually affirmative. In a remuant 
existence that is characterised by change, these more positive affects and dispositions remain 
remarkably constant. This paper closes with the hope that it might be possible to be as 
confident in the in the queer optimism of a remuant pedagogy as Susan Howe is affirmative 
of the power of poetry. Poetry, which is itself hardly exempt from the risk of educating its 
readers and its writers. Perhaps remuant pedagogy might hope to exhibit some attributes 
Howe ascribes to poetry in the concluding section of her My Emily Dickinson 
Poetry is the greatest stimulation of life. Poetry leads past possession of self to 
transfiguration beyond gender. Poetry is redemption from pessimism. Poetry is 
affirmation in negation, ammunition in the yellow eye of a gun that an allegorical 
pilgrim will shoot straight into the quiet of Night’s frame. (Howe 1985: 138) 
If the same were true of teaching it could be said that teaching is the greatest stimulation of 
life; teaching leads past possession of self to transfiguration beyond gender; teaching is 
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redemption from pessimism; teaching is affirmation in negation. If even the past can be 
repaired (without being whitewashed) by a pedagogy that seeks and operates with pleasure, 
interest and enjoyment as its affirmative markers, then an undeniably queer optimism arises 
for this remuant pedagogy. A remuant pedagogy: where a lack of focus can lead to an 
increase in clarity and where an affirmed provisionality both acknowledges and engages in 
the conditions of a remuant existence. 
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